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Zygadlo: Circuit Circus: What is the Correct Standard of Review Applicable

CIRCUIT CIRCUS: WHAT IS THE CORRECT
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO
SUPERVISED RELEASE APPEALS AFTER
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER?
I. INTRODUCTION
“In a final irony, he had to kill the [Sentencing] [G]uidelines
to save them.”1
Luci is a young woman with a troubled past.2 She was convicted
nearly nine years ago of possessing ammunition as a felon and sentenced
to 120 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
release. Supervised release functions as a distinct form of punishment,
which is imposed by a trial court and served in addition to a prison
term.3 Luci executed her prison time and was discharged to complete
her three-year term of supervised release in the community. She served
two years of that punishment successfully before being convicted in a
state court of attempting to elude police on a motorcycle, a crime which
placed her in violation of a condition of her release. As a result, an
Indiana federal district court ordered Luci to serve a sentence of twenty
months re-imprisonment, which she has decided to appeal. When Luci
appeals that determination to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, she
needs to be able to argue that either:
(1) the district court’s
determination should be set aside because it is “unreasonable”; or (2) it
should be set aside because it is “plainly unreasonable.” 4 It is imperative
to have a consistent and uniform standard so that Luci knows if, when,
and how to plead her appeal, and additionally, so that the proper degree
of deference is afforded to the district court.5 At the present time, given
the Seventh Circuit’s standard, Luci will argue that her sentence is

Cliff Sloan, Supreme Court Brief: Judge vs. Jury, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2005, 7:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2005/01/18/supreme-court-brief-judge-vsjury.html (discussing the paradox in the United States v. Booker decision given Justice
Stephen Breyer’s role in creating the Sentencing Guidelines as chief counsel of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and as a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
the 1980s). Breyer’s remedial opinion saves the Sentencing Guidelines’ handiwork for
judges, but makes them optional rather than compulsory. Id.
2
Luci is a hypothetical defendant. This narrative is loosely based on the case of United
States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2007). The facts have been changed slightly by the
author.
3
See infra Part II.A (explaining the concept of supervised release).
4
Sloan, supra note 1.
5
Id.
1
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“plainly unreasonable.”6 However, if she were a defendant in the Sixth
Circuit, for example, the standard would be one of “reasonableness.” 7
Such inconsistent standards of review among the circuits reflect
negatively on the evenhandness of the judiciary.8
United States v. Booker imparted both constitutional clarity and utter
confusion to the United States sentencing system. 9 The waters remain
murky regarding the review of sentences imposed following the
revocation of a defendant’s supervised release. Since Booker, ten of the
nation’s thirteen federal circuits have confronted the issue, and nine have
taken a stance on which standard is correct. 10 When analyzing this issue,
the courts have chiefly confronted two broad questions: (1) whether, by
announcing a standard of “reasonableness” review in Booker, the
Supreme Court meant to replace the “plainly unreasonable” standard
that the courts had been using in hearing appeals of supervised release
revocations; and (2) whether there is any real distinction between these
two standards.11
This Note specifically addresses the current state of the circuit split
as well as ideas on the correct standard of review for revocations of
supervised release. While most of the circuits have gravitated toward
the “reasonableness” standard, they continue to struggle internally over
whether there is an actual difference between the “plainly unreasonable”
See infra Part II.C–D (detailing the division among the circuits and the two basic
standards of review currently utilized).
7
See infra Part II.D (discussing the “reasonableness” standard of review, which has
been adopted by the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
8
See WORLD TRADE ORG., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS 161–62 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005) (noting that standards of review are
a very large part of procedural law in general). They play an important role in judicial
review. Id. “However, standards of review fulfil [sic] not only a procedural function but
can also represent a deliberate allocation of power between an authority taking a measure
and a judicial organ reviewing it.” Id. at 162.
9
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). “[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005) . . . converted the mandatory sentencing regime that had been in place since 1984 to
an advisory one . . . .” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
10
Elizabeth Stewart Hall, Comment, Determining the Proper Standard of Review for
Sentences Imposed After Revocation of Supervised Release in United States v. Bolds, 32 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 405, 410–11 (2008). “Though some of the circuits have refused to make a
decision on the issue, a majority of the circuits have chosen a standard to apply, albeit not
the same.” Id.; see United States v. Smith, 255 F. App’x 867, 868 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that Booker left numerous issues unsettled for the circuit courts and that the federal
judiciary has wrestled to identify the correct standard of review for revocations of
supervised release).
11
Hall, supra note 10, at 410–11.
6
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and the “reasonableness” standards.12 Furthermore, some circuits have
gone the opposite direction, choosing “plainly unreasonable” as the
correct standard.13 In addition, some circuits have not yet addressed
what the correct standard is, and one circuit has refused to decide the
question at this time.14
Much activity has taken place at the federal appellate level postBooker, and most circuits have key cases announcing an opinion on the
correct standard—either contributing to the arrival of a standard in a
meaningful way or simply refusing to confront the issue.15 Significant
strengths and weaknesses are present in each of the stances and it
remains unclear what the Supreme Court views to be the correct
standard.16
This Note attempts to give a voice to defendants like Luci and
resolve the split among the circuits. Part II of this Note describes
supervised release and gives the historical foundation of the split. 17 Part
III analyzes the current state of the circuit split.18 Part IV concludes with
a proposed application note and model judicial reasoning.19

See infra Part II.D (explaining the “reasonableness” approach and detailing the
subscribing circuits).
13
See infra Part II.C (describing the “plainly unreasonable” approach as the minority
position).
14
See infra Part II.B (noting that some circuits have not yet taken a stance as to the correct
approach).
15
See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 541 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper
standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d
672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the proper standard is “plainly unreasonable”);
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the proper standard
is “plainly unreasonable”); United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir.
2006) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Miqbel, 444
F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”);
United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the proper standard is
“reasonableness”); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the proper standard is “reasonableness”); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the proper standard is “reasonableness”); infra Part II (laying
the foundation for an analysis of the split among the circuits).
16
For example, this Note proposes that Rita and Gall have added a further layer of
confusion, rather than clarity, to the analysis. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see infra Part III.C.1 (detailing Rita and Gall’s impacts on
the analysis of the correct post-Booker standard of review).
17
See infra Part II (giving background on this topic).
18
See infra Part III (analyzing potential criticisms of the plainly unreasonable standard,
Booker, and the ease with which a portion of the SRA can be severed).
19
See infra Part IV (offering a potential solution to the split among the circuits utilizing
the “plainly unreasonable” standard).
12
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II. BACKGROUND
United States v. Booker has been a watershed in the United States
sentencing system.20 Since Booker, the appellate courts have attempted to
resolve whether the Supreme Court meant to replace the “plainly
unreasonable” standard used by courts in hearing post-revocation
appeals, and whether there is a real difference between the “plainly
unreasonable” and “reasonableness” standards.21 This Note specifically
focuses on the current state of the circuit split and advances ideas on the
correct standard of review for revocations of supervised release; each of
the stances taken by the different circuits have both strengths and
weaknesses, and the Supreme Court’s views about the proper standard
remain ambiguous.22
Part II of this Note gives a summary and history of supervised
release and explains the impact of Booker on the current state of affairs in
the federal appellate courts respecting their standards of review for
supervised release revocations.
Part II.A gives details regarding
supervised release as a sentencing concept and the “plainly
unreasonable” standard that came about with the Sentencing Reform Act
(“SRA”) and the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing
Guidelines”).23 Part II.B reveals how Booker sent this system into a state
of unrest.24 It also shows the gradual unfolding in the aftermath of
Booker and the formation of an uneven circuit split. 25 The circuits have
utilized two main approaches in an attempt to choose a standard of
review for revocations of supervised release: the “plainly unreasonable”
standard and the “reasonableness” standard. 26 Part II.C focuses on the
Part II.D discusses the
“plainly unreasonable” standard.27
“reasonableness” standard and shows the internal division among the
circuits that use the “reasonableness” standard: some circuits find no

20
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). As the Booker majority noted, sentencing
appeals, sentencing departures, and revocations of supervised release are important
concerns within the United States’ criminal justice system. Id. at 262.
21
Hall, supra note 10, at 410–11.
22
See infra Part III.C.1 (detailing Rita and Gall’s impacts on the analysis of the rightful
standard of review).
23
See infra Part II.A (giving a summary of supervised release and the “plainly
unreasonable” standard).
24
See infra Part II.B (explaining what Booker did to the “plainly unreasonable” standard
and what happened in the wake of Booker).
25
See infra Part II.B (describing Booker’s impact on the “plainly unreasonable” standard).
26
See infra Part II.C–D (detailing the division among the circuits and the two basic
standards of review currently utilized).
27
See infra Part II.C (explaining the “plainly unreasonable” standard and the
methodologies and theories of the subscribing circuits).
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difference between the two standards while others see a difference, but
nevertheless choose to follow the “reasonableness” guidepost. 28
A. Summary of Supervised Release and the “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard
Supervised release is unique because it functions as an additional
phase of punishment following a period of incarceration. 29 After being
found guilty of a crime at the trial court level, a defendant may be
sentenced to both a term of incarceration and a term of supervised
release.30 Supervised release sentences, as seen in Luci’s case above, are
served after completion of the incarceration period. 31 Supervised release
comes with conditions, which, if violated, can lead to consequences
including re-imprisonment or an extension or modification of the terms
of the supervised release period.32 The determination that a violation
has occurred is made by a trial court and is appealable, and, as with all
appeals, the amount of discretion that the appellate court shall afford the
trial court’s decision is governed by a standard of review. 33

See infra Part II.D (discussing the “reasonableness” standard).
See infra Part II.A.1 (differentiating between parole and supervised release).
30
See infra Part II.A.1 (expounding on the imposition of supervised release).
31
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical).
32
See Understanding the Requirements of Supervised Release and Probation Supervision, U.S.
PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERVICES OFF. DISTRICT R.I., http://www.rip.uscourts.gov/rip/
supervision/understandingthereqs/UnderstandingtheRequirements.pdf (last visited Oct.
2, 2011) (stating that imposition of a prison sentence and more supervised release likely
follows revocation of a term of supervised release to ensure that an offender’s re-entry is
both safe for the community and successful for the participant). According to this source,
nationwide supervised revocation rates are approximately twelve to fifteen percent
(meaning that somewhere between eighty-five and eighty-eight percent of offenders
successfully complete their term of supervised release without revocation). Id. Violations
of supervised release leading to revocation do not constitute separate charges because
supervised release is only “a continuation of the original charge.” United States v. ValdezSanchez, 414 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2005). “The supervised release period is an
independent element of the [original] sentence. It is not carved out of the maximum
permissible time allotted for incarceration under some other criminal statute.” United
States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Douglas A. Morris, Representing a
Client Charged with Violating Conditions of Supervised Release—Part I, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF.
LAW., Nov. 2006, at 28, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=927&
terms=douglas+morris+and+representing+a+client+charged+with+violating (giving a
practitioner’s view of supervised release mechanics).
33
See Thomas A. Sheehan, Standard of Review on Appeal, 53 J. MO. B. 281, 281 (1997),
available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/1997/sepoct/sheehan.htm (“The standard of
review determines the degree of scrutiny the appellate court will apply when reviewing the
rulings made below. . . . The impact of the standard of review is enormous.”).
28
29
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The concept of supervised release is not old, as it originated with the
introduction of the SRA and the Sentencing Guidelines. 34 Similar to
other types of sentences, there are specific repercussions for a breach of
the terms of a defendant’s supervised release. 35 However, the policy
statements outlining the requirements of supervised release are
significantly different from the Sentencing Guidelines controlling other
types of sentences.36 18 U.S.C. § 3742 housed the traditional standard of
review pertaining to revocations of supervised release pre-Booker.37
1.

The Creation of Supervised Release and What Happens When a
Person Violates the Terms of Their Supervised Release

The SRA, which accompanied the implementation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, created supervised release in 1984.38 Supervised release is
essentially a form of post-imprisonment supervision that may be
imposed by a trial court as a part of an initial sentence of
imprisonment.39 It differs from parole in that supervised release does
not replace a portion of an imprisonment term. 40 Supervised release is
See infra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining the origin of supervised release as
a sentencing concept).
35
See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing what happens after a defendant violates his or her
supervised release terms).
36
See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the differences between policy statements and the once
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines).
37
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the traditional pre-Booker standard of review).
38
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009).
39
Id.; see Bob Katzen, Beacon Hill Roll Call: Local Senators’ 2010 Per Diems Announced,
TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE (Jan. 16, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.tauntongazette.com/
state_news/x512660834/BEACON-HILL-ROLL-CALL-Local-senators-2010-per-diemsannounced (exemplifying that supervised release is a common sentencing tool, even for
defendants who have not spent much time in the system). For example, the U.S. Attorney’s
office announced in 2010 “that Patrice Tierney, wife of Congressman John Tierney, was
sentenced to [thirty] days in prison and then two years of supervised release, including five
months of home confinement, on charges of aiding and abetting the filing of false federal
tax returns for her brother.” Id.; see also Eric Tucker, Judge: ‘Survivor’ Winner Broke Terms of
Release, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/wireStory?id=
12579156 (demonstrating that even the rich and famous are sometimes sentenced to
supervised release). “Reality TV star Richard Hatch violated the terms of his supervised
release by failing to refile his tax returns, a judge ruled Monday, but he said he hadn’t
decided whether to put the ‘Survivor’ winner back behind bars. He delayed sentencing
until he could receive additional arguments.” Id.
40
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009). According to the
Sentencing Guidelines, “[u]nlike parole, a term of supervised release does not replace a
portion of the sentence of imprisonment, but rather is an order of supervision in addition to
any term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” Id. “[S]upervised release is more
analogous to the additional ‘special parole term’ previously authorized for certain drug
offenses.” Id. A strict definition of supervised release is as follows: “[s]upervised release
[is] the period of time when an offender, serving a determinate sentence, is supervised in
34
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also different from probation because it is imposed following
imprisonment, whereas probation is imposed in place of imprisonment.41
Once a defendant is adjudged to have violated a condition of his or her
supervised release, the court has the option of continuing the defendant
on supervised release, with the choice of extending or modifying the
conditions of the term, or revoking the supervised release altogether and
The periods of
imposing an additional term of incarceration.42
imprisonment authorized by statute for violating a stipulation of
supervised release are normally more limited than those available for a
violation of probation.43
the community following release from the prison portion of the offender’s sentence. It is
expressed in terms of a set number of months.”
Victim Assistance Program:
Terms/Definitions, MINN. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.corr.state.mn.us/crimevictim/
terms.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
41
See Morris, supra note 32 (highlighting the differences between supervised release and
probation).
42
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009); see Brendan Kirby, Judge
Sentences ‘Bonnie and Clyde’ Couple for String of Drug-Fueled Bank Robberies, PRESS-REGISTER
(Jan. 30, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2011/01/judge_sentences_bonnie-andcly.html (giving just one example of how a defendant can break the terms of his or her
supervised release). Jerry Tinsely violated his supervised release by going on a drugfueled robbery spree with his girlfriend in “Bonnie and Clyde” fashion in March of 2010.
Id. The judge gave Tinsley a six year and five month prison sentence for his new charges,
and also “revoked his supervised release on a federal gun charge and ordered him to go to
prison for [two] years in that case.” Id.; see also Ty Tagami, Doctor Who Didn’t Want to Work
Going Back to Prison, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 27, 2011, 7:18 PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/doctor-who-didnt-want-818257.html (giving an example of an
unusual revocation of supervised release). “A doctor released from prison after serving
time for tax evasion will be going back because of a scheme he concocted to avoid getting a
job.” Id. Dr. Brown was out on supervised release after serving time in prison for federal
tax evasion. Id. “A condition of his release was that he look for a job. His release already
had been revoked once for failure to look for work, so he dreamed up a scheme to fake a
job.” Id. The judge apparently didn’t think that the scheme was funny, as he sentenced Dr.
Brown to three more years in federal prison after revoking his supervised release for giving
false information to a federal officer. Id.
43
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009). For instance, the maximum
penalty able to be imposed for a violation of supervised release given for a class A felony is
a five-year prison term. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) states the terms for supervised release after
imprisonment as follows:
(b) AUTHORIZED TERMS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE.—Except as otherwise
provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are—
(1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years;
(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and
(3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty
offense), not more than one year.
18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006 & Supp. 2009). Both supervised release and probation “occur after
imprisonment, and . . . involve governmental supervision after release.” United States v.
Reyes, 48 F.3d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1995). However, there are at least two important
differences between supervised release and probation. Id. One “is that supervised release
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From the outset, the United States Sentencing Commission chose to
promulgate policy statements creating and governing revocations of
supervised release.44 They did this rather than issuing Sentencing
Guidelines administering to supervised release because it gave courts
more flexibility in devising revocation sentences.45 Consequently,
differing from the Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory for the
sentencing courts (pre-Booker), the policy statements for sentences
stemming from revocations of supervised release were always purely
advisory.46 As a result, the Chapter Seven policy statements have always
is a form of post-imprisonment supervision that is in addition to the term of imprisonment,
while probation is supervision in lieu of incarceration.” Id. (citation omitted). This
difference may change the length of the sentence served. Id. The second difference, at least
in some states, is that “the focus of probation has been shifted from rehabilitation to
deterrence.” Id. at 438–39.
44
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmts. 1, 3(a) (2009).
45
Id.; see United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 763–66 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit
stated that:
When Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to formulate
“[G]uidelines,” it also told the courts to follow the
[G]uidelines. . . . Congress also provided that an incorrect application
of the [G]uidelines was grounds for reversal.
Congress did not, however, impose the same requirements with
respect to policy statements.
Although Congress directed the
Commission to promulgate “general policy statements,” it never stated
that courts were bound to follow them. Instead, Congress provided
that a sentencing court need only “consider” applicable policy
statements when imposing sentence. . . . Not a single statute states that
incorrect application of a policy statement is grounds for reversal. Not
a single statute states that policy statements must be followed, nor does
any guideline approved by Congress. . . . In sum, Congress has said
nothing to indicate that policy statements are anything other than
advisory. . . .
It is plain that Congress has made a clear distinction between
[G]uidelines, which have the force of law, and policy statements,
which are only advisory. There are good reasons for this distinction.
Guidelines, unlike policy statements, must be submitted to Congress
before taking effect.
The review procedure applies only to
[G]uidelines proper, not policy statements. Congress must have
deemed it desirable to have a mix of controlling and advisory material
under the [G]uidelines system, giving the Commission and the courts
the flexibility required in sentencing.
Id. at 763–64 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(a) (2009) (stating that the United States
Sentencing Commission has itself characterized its policy statements as advisory). For a
discussion of sentencing discretion after Booker and Gall, see Alan Ellis & James H.
Feldman, Jr., Feature: Federal Sentencing Under the Advisory Guidelines: A Primer for the
Occasional Federal Practitioner—Part Two, 32 CHAMPION 36, 40 (2008).
46
See Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (discussing the advisory nature of the policy
statements); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmts.
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been more concise and elementary than the Sentencing Guidelines that
apply to original sentences.47
2.

18 U.S.C. § 3742: The Traditional Standard of Review Pre-Booker

Before 2005, a defendant’s appeal of a revocation of supervised
release was reviewed under the standard found in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).48
1, 3(a) (2009) (explaining that, from the very beginning, the United States Sentencing
Commission chose to promulgate policy statements for supervised release rather than
binding Sentencing Guidelines).
47
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 1 (2009).
According to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3), the Sentencing Commission is required to
issue [G]uidelines or policy statements applicable to the revocation of
probation and supervised release. At this time, the Commission has
chosen to promulgate policy statements only. These policy statements
will provide guidance while allowing for the identification of any
substantive or procedural issues that require further review. The
Commission views these policy statements as evolutionary and will
review relevant data and materials concerning revocation
determinations under these policy statements.
Id. Furthermore:
At the outset, the Commission faced a choice between promulgating
[G]uidelines or issuing advisory policy statements for the revocation of
probation and supervised release. After considered debate and input
from judges, probation officers, and prosecuting and defense
attorneys, the Commission decided, for a variety of reasons, initially to
issue policy statements. Not only was the policy statement option
expressly authorized by statute, but this approach provided greater
flexibility to both the Commission and the courts. Unlike [G]uidelines,
policy statements are not subject to the May 1 statutory deadline for
submission to Congress, and the Commission believed that it would
benefit from the additional time to consider complex issues relating to
revocation [G]uidelines provided by the policy statement option.
Moreover, the Commission anticipates that, because of its greater
flexibility, the policy statement option will provide better
opportunities for evaluation by the courts and the Commission. This
flexibility is important, given that supervised release as a method of
post-incarceration supervision and transformation of probation from a
suspension of sentence to a sentence in itself represent recent changes
in federal sentencing practices.
Id. at introductory cmt. 3(a).
48
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 & Supp. 2009). This statute established that the court of
appeals should decide whether the sentence:
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
[S]entencing [G]uidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement
of reasons required by [§] 3553(c);
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That section also provides for de novo review of the trial court’s decision
to depart from the policy statements.49 Thus, the traditional standard of
review utilized by appellate courts in reviewing post-revocation
sentences was “plainly unreasonable.”50 This is because a violation of
supervised release is a non-Sentencing Guideline offense (i.e., it falls
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)).51
B. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard and the Aftermath of Booker
The “plainly unreasonable” standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)
mentioned above was questioned by the landmark case of United States v.
Booker, which considered the effect of mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
on defendants’ sentences.52 In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that
two decisions—Apprendi53 and Blakely54—applied to the Sentencing

(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range
based on a factor that—
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in
[§] 3553(a)(2); or
(ii) is not authorized under [§] 3553(b); or
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the
applicable [G]uidelines range, having regard for the factors
to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in
[§] 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of
the particular sentence, as stated by the district court
pursuant to the provisions of [§] 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
Id.
Id. § 3742(e). It states:
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly
erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection
(3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court’s
application of the [G]uidelines to the facts.
With respect to
determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals
shall review de novo the district court’s application of the [G]uidelines
to the facts.
Id. (emphasis added).
50
See Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (explaining the split among the circuits after Booker).
51
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see Hall, supra note 10, at 408 (expounding on this statement and
noting that it is an offense governed by policy statements).
52
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
53
In Apprendi, the Court found that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, “any fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
49
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Guidelines and that, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) were unconstitutional. 55
The five-to-four Booker decision rendered two idiosyncratic opinions
addressing overlapping constitutional issues: (1) whether the mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines set out in the SRA violated defendants’ right to a
jury under the Sixth Amendment; and (2) if the Sentencing Guidelines
infringed those rights, whether the Court should invalidate the entire
SRA.56 The substantive constitutional opinion delivered by Justice
Stevens addressed the first of the above questions.57 He explained,
reminiscent of Apprendi, that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict

In invalidating a petitioner’s sentence, the Blakely Court found that Washington’s
sentencing procedure did not comply with the Sixth Amendment, consistent with its
holding in Apprendi. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). “Our precedents
make clear . . . that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.” Id. Ultimately, “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings.” Id. at 303–04. A judge exceeds his proper
authority if he “inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow [because]
the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment . . . .’”
Id.
55
Booker, 543 U.S. at 220. The Sentencing Guidelines were, in effect, only advisory. Id.
Trial courts were required to take the Sentencing Guidelines into consideration but were
not bound by them. Id. Review of sentencing determinations was thus to be subjected to a
“reasonableness” standard. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (delineating the rights of
defendants in these types of situations).
56
See Hall, supra note 10, at 409 (explaining that the Booker Court handed down a splitdecision—with the first opinion addressing whether the application of the Guidelines was
violative of the Sixth Amendment, and the second dealing with how to remedy the Sixth
Amendment infringement found by the Court); see also United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568,
575 (6th Cir. 2007) (delineating a case where a defendant challenged, on “reasonableness”
grounds, the sentence imposed following the trial court’s revocation of the defendant’s
four-year period of supervised release).
57
Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion
dissenting in part, in which Souter, J., joined, and in which Scalia, J.,
joined except for Part III and footnote 17, and Thomas, J., filed
opinions dissenting in part. Breyer, J., filed an opinion dissenting in
part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
54
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must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”58
Justice Breyer concentrated on the second question in a separate
remedial opinion, where he declared that two provisions, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e),59 must be severed and deleted to
implement the constitutional holding.60 The Court made clear that
instead of applying the de novo standard of review found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e), appellate courts needed to apply the recognizable standard of
“reasonableness.”61 “Reasonableness” was the standard administered to
Sentencing Guideline departures until 2003, when Congress substituted
the de novo standard.62 However, the Court did not spell out whether, by
excising 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), it meant to alter the “plainly unreasonable”
standard of review used for sentences with no applicable Sentencing
Guidelines, including sentences for violations of supervised release. 63
Soon after the decision was handed down, defendants appealing
revocations of supervised release began to assert that the Booker
“reasonableness” standard of review had replaced the more deferential
standard of “plainly unreasonable.”64 The split among the circuits

See id. at 244 (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Apprendi and applying Blakely to the
Sentencing Guidelines); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 (holding that it was unconstitutional to
take from the jury the appraisal of facts that increased the prescribed range of penalties to
which the petitioner was subjected); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313–14 (finding that the jury’s
verdict alone did not authorize the sentence and so the sentencing procedure did not
comply with the Sixth Amendment).
59
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing the provision making
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 Supp.).
60
Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45; see Leigha Simonton, Booker’s Impact on the Standard of
Review Governing Supervised Release and Probation Revocation Sentences, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM.
L. 129, 136 (2006) (quoting Booker and discussing the excision of the unconstitutional
portions of the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the ruling’s impact on supervised release
appeals). But see Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997)
(relating that courts can sever uses or portions of a statute that are decidedly
unconstitutional or wrong from applications that are valid and can continue to apply the
constitutional or lawful portions), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 247.
61
Simonton, supra note 60, at 136.
62
Id. “In 2003, Congress modified the pre-existing text [of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)], adding a
de novo standard of review for departures and inserting cross-references to [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(b)(1).” Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
63
Simonton, supra note 60, at 136; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (giving the rights to
defendants, which the Booker Court announced were violated by mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (codifying the Sentencing Guidelines).
64
Simonton, supra note 60, at 136; see Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1516 (2006) (reading
Booker to create an egalitarian sentencing system whereby all sentences are governed by
advisory Sentencing Guidelines and judged by the same appellate standard of review); see
also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
58
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regarding the correct standard of review in supervised release revocation
cases was a direct outgrowth of the confusion spawned by Booker.65
Since Booker, ten circuits have confronted which standard to use in
reviewing appeals of sentences imposed post-revocation.66 Nine of these
ten circuits have taken a stance on the issue, with the Fifth Circuit being
the only one to remain undecided.67 When analyzing this issue, the
courts have generally confronted two broad questions: (1) whether, by
announcing a standard of “unreasonableness” review in Booker, the
Supreme Court had meant to replace the “plainly unreasonable”
standard; and (2) whether there is any real distinction between these
standards.68 The circuits’ answers to these questions follow.
C. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard
When faced with appellate cases post-Booker, only two circuits have
held that the “plainly unreasonable” standard of review has survived
Booker.69 The Fourth and the Seventh Circuits have announced that the
two standards, though similar, are not factually the same.70 They have
also concluded that Booker did not displace the traditional “plainly
unreasonable” standard of review applied to post-revocation sentences
in favor of another standard.71
The decisive case addressing the proper standard of review for postrevocation sentencing in the Fourth Circuit is United States v. Crudup.72
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 53–54 (2003) (evidencing an emerging egalitarian
approach).
65
See Hall, supra note 10, at 410 (discussing the resulting split among the circuits).
66
See id. at 410–11 (including all of the circuits except for the First, the D.C., and the
Federal).
67
See United States v. Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted)
(“We will affirm a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised
release unless it is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘plainly unreasonable.’ We have not yet decided which
of the above standards of review apply in the wake of Booker, and we decline to do so
today . . . .”); United States v. Smith, 255 F. App’x 867, 868 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted)
(“This court has yet to decide which standard of review is applicable to revocation
sentences. We decline to address this issue now as Smith’s argument fails under both the
‘reasonable’ and the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standards of review.”); United States v. Jones,
484 F.3d 783, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that there is a split among the circuits
regarding the standard of review for revocation of supervised release sentences and
declining to reach the issue).
68
Hall, supra note 10, at 411.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006). In Crudup, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reviewed a district court decision in which a defendant was sentenced to a thirty-six month
term of imprisonment after his supervised release sentence was revoked. Id. at 434–35.
The defendant claimed that the length of his revocation sentence was “plainly
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Though acknowledging the dissimilar position taken by many of its
fellow circuits, the Fourth Circuit relied on implications derived from the
language and structure of portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 not stricken by
Booker to conclude that the “plainly unreasonable” standard had
survived.73 The court inferred from 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4)
that the proper standard was “plainly unreasonable.”74 It stated that “[i]t
would seem incongruous that a defendant limited to asserting that his
revocation sentence is ‘plainly unreasonable,’ would be allowed to argue
that his sentence should be reversed because it is ‘unreasonable.’”75
Employing Sentencing Guidelines commentary and statutory provisions,
the court distinguished revocation sentences from original sentences and
suggested that the deviations perhaps warranted different standards of
review, “reasonableness” for original sentences and “plainly
unreasonable” for revocation sentences.76
The Fourth Circuit subsequently addressed whether there was any
actual difference between the two standards, finding them to be similar
though not identical, and concluding that Congress distinguished the
two expressions.77 The appellate court then gave its definition of the
“plainly unreasonable” standard.78 According to the Fourth Circuit, the
first step in the review process is to determine if the original sentence is

unreasonable” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4). Id. at 435. After reviewing the structure
of § 3742 and interrelated statutory and guideline provisions, the court held that revocation
sentences should be reviewed under a “plainly unreasonable” standard using the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. Id. at 439. Deciding that the defendant’s sentence was not “plainly
unreasonable,” the court affirmed. Id. at 440; see United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the holding in Crudup).
73
See Hall, supra note 10, at 411 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit rejected the adoption
of a “reasonableness” standard).
74
18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006 & Supp. 2009). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) states: “A
defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final
sentence if the sentence . . . (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no
[S]entencing [G]uideline and is plainly unreasonable.” Id. § 3742(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)
states: “The Government may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an
otherwise final sentence if the sentence . . . (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is
no [S]entencing [G]uideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b); see Hall,
supra note 10, at 411–12 (noting that § (b)(4) “also mandates the ‘plainly unreasonable’
standard for similar appeals by the government”); see also Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438 (noting
flaws with the “reasonableness” standard).
75
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437.
76
Id.
77
See id. at 438. The Fourth Circuit held that “Congress used both terms—
‘unreasonable’ and ‘plainly unreasonable’—in [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), the standard of review
section that Booker excised.” Id. As “there is no indication that Congress intended the word
‘plainly’ to be surplusage, the best interpretation of these two terms in their context is that
they are not coterminous.” Id.
78
Simonton, supra note 60, at 151.
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“unreasonable.”79 If not, the sentence should be affirmed; but, if the
sentence is “unreasonable,” the court must resolve whether it is
“plainly” so, using the same definition of “plain” utilized in the plain
error analysis.80
After refusing to answer the question of which standard was correct
in United States v. Rush and United States v. Flagg (likely hoping that the
other circuits or the Supreme Court would sort out the issue in the
interim), the Seventh Circuit decided to preserve the “plainly
unreasonable” standard of review for revocations of supervised release
in United States v. Kizeart.81 Like the Fourth Circuit in Crudup, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed that the “plainly
unreasonable” standard existed in statutory text other than the portions
excised by Booker.82 The court reasoned, “[w]e are not disregarding a
Supreme Court dictum . . . for apart from the omission of a reference to
subsection (e)(4), there is nothing . . . to suggest that the [Booker] Court
was altering the statutory standard of appellate review of sentences for
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438.
Id. at 439. Hence, for purposes of deciding whether an unreasonable sentence is
plainly unreasonable, “[p]lain is synonymous with clear or, equivalently, obvious.” Id. at
439 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81
See United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We have not squarely
addressed this issue and need not resolve it today as we conclude that Flagg’s sentence is
appropriate regardless of whether we review it under the ‘plainly unreasonable’
standard . . . or the reasonableness standard . . . .”); United States v. Rush, 132 F. App’x 54,
56 (7th Cir. 2005). In Rush, the court stated:
[C]ounsel considers whether Rush might argue that his new term of
imprisonment is not “reasonable” under United States v. Booker. It is
not clear that Booker requires any change in our evaluation of prison
terms imposed upon revocation of supervised release, since the
revocation policy statements have always been advisory only. Two of
our sister circuits have concluded that Booker replaced the “plainly
unreasonable” standard we formerly applied with its new
“reasonableness” standard, [referring to United States v. Fleming in the
Second Circuit and United States v. Edwards in the Eighth Circuit], but
even if the two formulations are qualitatively different we would not
find error under either.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the defendant violated his supervised release by committing a felony). The
only issue raised by counsel on appeal was whether Booker had altered the standard of
review for sentences imposed post-revocation of supervised release, i.e., whether Booker
changed the standard from “plainly unreasonable” to “reasonableness.” Id. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that although Booker invalidated 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e), it did not directly address § 3742(e)(4), the portion providing that post-revocation
sentences dealing with supervised release could be reversed only if they were “plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 675.
82
Hall, supra note 10, at 412. The author explains that the “plainly unreasonable”
standard existed in parts of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 not touched by Booker. Id.
79
80
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violating conditions of supervised release.”83 The court also focused on
the use of the plural form of the word “standards” referenced by the
Booker Court (i.e., at least two—“plainly unreasonable” and
Concluding that nothing suggested that the
“reasonableness”).84
Supreme Court had aimed to merge the two standards mentioned in
Booker, the Seventh Circuit decided that “plainly unreasonable” was the
correct standard of review for cases without applicable Sentencing
Guidelines, including revocations of supervised release.85
The Seventh Circuit, while recognizing that the difference between
the two standards is marginal, referenced Crudup, acknowledging that
“the courts must respect Congress’s wish to curtail appellate review of
non-[G]uidelines sentences particularly sharply, and so must seek to give
meaning to the difference between ‘unreasonable’ and ‘plainly
unreasonable.’”86 One basis mentioned by the Seventh Circuit for why a
more limited scope of review is apt for non-Guidelines sentences is that
the United States Sentencing Commission’s decision not to issue

83
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 674 (declining to adopt a new standard post-Booker for revocations
of supervised release). “We shall therefore adhere to our [earlier] ruling[s] . . . requiring
that a defendant who challenges his sentence for violating supervised release show that the
sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.
84
Id. (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 262) (internal citations omitted) (providing that the
Kizeart court stated that “reasonableness standards [not standard] are not foreign to
sentencing law”).
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39 (4th Cir. 2006)); see id. at 674–
75 (approving Crudup’s stance); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (noting
that it is a fundamental tenant of statutory construction that a statute should not be
interpreted so as to render language within it superfluous); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510
U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (observing that language in statutes should not be construed so as to
render any part mere surplus); Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983) (“[T]he
settled principle of statutory construction [is] that we must give effect . . . to every word of
the statute.”); Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1999)) (stating that “‘it is
possible, though not always easy,’ to distinguish among the canonical standards of review
and acknowledging the ‘skepticism’ which has emerged ‘in the past about the ability of
judges to apply more than a few standards of review’”). The canon of construction and
interpretation, which directs the courts to give full effect to every word in a statute so long
as it does not render it contradictory proves that it is not up to the courts to disregard
language inserted by the legislature and left intact after Booker. YULE KIM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS 4 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. “A basic
principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the
legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’” Id. at 12. The
modern version of this “is that statutes should be construed ‘so as to avoid rendering
superfluous’ any statutory language.” Id.; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of
construction).
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Sentencing Guidelines in this area connotes that the district courts
should have more flexibility in sentencing.87 Thus, a short maximum
prison term penalty for supervised release violations means that there is
less at stake, demanding fewer strata of judicial review crucial to
satisfying the constitutional necessities of due process of law.88
Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted that appellate courts can
comprehend and apply the differences between deferential and
nondeferential standards.89 However, “the making of finer gradations
within the category of deferential review strains judicial
competence . . . .”90 Though the tiers exist in a formal nature, in most
cases, appellate courts recognize that the level of deference given to the
trial court depends less on the announced official standard than on the
nature of the question.91 The perceived competence of the district court
in the eyes of the appellate court comes into play as well.92 Kizeart relates
that while courts do their best to observe any gradations Congress
mandates, they cannot assure immense success in the undertaking.93
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.
Id.; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (explaining that courts consider
“the degree of potential deprivation” caused by an administrative adjudication when
determining whether the decision-making process violated the plaintiff’s due process
rights).
89
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. Using judicial review of sanctions imposed by prison
disciplinary boards, the court analogized the “plainly unreasonable” standard to the
standard used in those cases and provided several example cases to emphasize its point.
Id.; see Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–57 (1985) (stating “[r]equiring a modicum of
evidence to support” the prison disciplinary board’s decision and “the requirements of due
process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary
board to revoke good time credits,” and “any evidence” or “meager” evidence will do);
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that while “‘some
evidence’ . . . must bear some indicia of reliability . . . [it need only cross a] meager
threshold.”); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted) (noting “some evidence in the record,” “any evidence,” “a modicum of evidence,”
“meager proof will suffice,” “not much” evidence, but the evidence “must point to the
accused’s guilt” through this “lenient standard” of review).
90
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.
91
Id.
92
See id. (stating that, “in most cases, . . . appellate judges are merely giving the benefit
of the doubt to the trier of fact . . . [which] depends . . . [in part on] the institutional
competence of the first-level decision maker relative to that of the appellate court”).
93
Id.; see Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial SelfRestraint in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 89 (2009) (stating that while all of
the different standards of review are stated and seemingly defined with time-honored
words, many of those standards use undefined words to define their own expressions). “If
the standard to be achieved is consistency of outcome, then more than mere consistency of
definition is required for the standards of review to serve their intended function of
maintaining the proper relationship between trial courts and appellate courts.” Id. at 90. It
follows that courts must therefore apply a consistent amount of deference to the trial
court’s decision under each standard. Id. “Because that sort of consistency is unlikely to be
87
88
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D. The “Reasonableness” Standard
The second major approach is one of “reasonableness.” Yet, among
the circuits that have chosen “reasonableness” as their standard for
reviewing post-revocation sentences, there is an additional split. 94 Some
circuits have chosen the “reasonableness” standard, yet believe that there
is no difference between the “plainly unreasonable” and the
“reasonableness” standards.95 Other circuits have taken the opposite
stance, finding that “reasonableness” is the correct standard, yet
differentiate between it and “plainly unreasonable.”96 A detailed
explanation of this split within a circuit split follows.
1.

Following the “Reasonableness” Approach: Finding No Difference
Between the “Plainly Unreasonable” and “Reasonableness”
Standards

The Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
Booker’s “reasonableness” standard of review is equivalent to the
“plainly unreasonable” standard, though they have announced
“reasonableness” as their official test.97 After deciding that Booker had
not changed the standard of review for post-revocation sentences, these
circuits have applied the “reasonableness” standard because, in their
estimate, it was the same one that had been utilized before Booker.98 In
reaching the aforementioned conclusion, these four circuits looked to an
excerpt from Booker, which explained that “reasonableness” standards
were not alien to sentencing law.99 As illustrations for this position, the

achieved through the usual route of judicial review, the onus lies upon the individual
appellate court . . . to remain faithful to the spirit of the appropriate standard of review in
working through the decision-making process.” Id. Consequently, “the standard of review
is effective as a limitation on judicial power only to the extent that reviewing courts
consistently interpret the scope of review available under each standard and abide by that
limitation in deciding cases.” Id.
94
See infra Part II.D.1–2 (discussing the internal split among the circuits subscribing to
“reasonableness”).
95
See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the circuits that follow a “reasonableness” approach
yet find no difference between the two standards).
96
See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the circuits that follow a “reasonableness” approach
while finding a difference between the two standards).
97
Simonton, supra note 60, at 136.
98
Hall, supra note 10, at 414.
99
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005). The Booker majority stated that
“‘[r]easonableness’ standards are not foreign to sentencing law. The [SRA] has long
required their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of departures,
and on review of sentences imposed where there was no applicable [Sentencing] Guideline.
Together, these cases account for about 16.7% of sentencing appeals.” Id. (citations
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Supreme Court cited several cases in which the “plainly unreasonable”
standard was used.100 Accordingly, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits viewed this as an endorsement of the appropriate standard to be
used.101
While the Sixth Circuit questioned the foundation of the
“reasonableness” standard, it remained ambivalent regarding the proper
standard applicable to supervised release revocation appeals until its
determination to recognize the “reasonableness” standard in United
States v. Bolds.102 First, the appellate court looked to the intent of the
Supreme Court in Booker and subsequent cases.103 In Bolds, the Sixth
Circuit used two decisions that had recently been handed down by the
omitted). The Booker Court then went on to list several examples of cases to further its
point. Id.
100
See id. at 262 (citing several cases that used the “plainly unreasonable” standard); see
also United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to sentence defendants to longer terms than
suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines and that the defendants were not entitled to notice
that the district court was contemplating a sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines
range because Chapter Seven policy statements were not binding and the revocation
sentences outside their ranges were not departures); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210,
1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the trial court did not err in considering the special
medicinal and correctional needs of the defendant in determining how much time the
defendant should be required to serve in prison after he failed to abide by the conditions of
his supervised release); United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming
a district court’s revocation of the defendant’s supervised release and imposition of a
twenty-four month prison term after he violated the terms of his release on multiple
occasions and finding that the trial court’s decision was not “plainly unreasonable”);
United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (finding that under
the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), as amended, the court was authorized to resentence the defendant for violating probation without being restricted to the guideline
range applicable at the time of the initial sentencing hearing); United States v. Olabanji, 268
F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred by failing to consider the
range applicable to the underlying offense after rejecting the range prescribed by the policy
statement, and reversing and directing the trial court to consider the Sentencing Guidelines
range for the underlying offense as part of the calculus for imposing an appropriate term of
incarceration); United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 241 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that
the trial court’s revocation sentence was not an abuse of discretion and that, even though it
was outside the Sentencing Guidelines range, it was within the statutory range).
101
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 262 (listing cases from these circuits that used the “plainly
unreasonable” standard).
102
511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007). In Bolds, a defendant appealed the decision of the district
court challenging, on “reasonableness” grounds, the sentence imposed following the trial
court’s revocation of the defendant’s four-year period of supervised release. Id. at 570; see
United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “Booker left
[18 U.S.C. §§] 3742(a), 3742(b), and 3742(f) on the books, and . . . our cases have relied upon
both [§§] 3742(a)(4) and 3742(e)(4) in applying a ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard. . . . These
sections, by themselves, give us pause about accepting the Second Circuit’s approach”).
103
Bolds, 511 F.3d at 574; see Hall, supra note 10, at 416 (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis).
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Supreme Court—Rita v. United States and Gall v. United States—in
resolving the question.104 The Sixth Circuit used these two cases to plug
the voids left by Booker.105 From this standpoint, the Booker Court had
not created a new standard of review for supervised release revocation
sentences.106 In its estimation, the Supreme Court had, in actuality,
directed appellate courts to employ the unchanged “reasonableness”
standard in their review of all sentences—Guidelines and nonGuidelines.107 Hence, a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, for
reasonableness,” is the Sixth Circuit’s current standard.108
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion discussed the fact that the “plainly
unreasonable” standard existed in portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 that had
not been excised by Booker.109 The court also dealt with whether the
Supreme Court had intended to replace the former “plainly
unreasonable” standard with one of “reasonableness” by exploring the
positions taken by other circuits.110 The court found virtue in an
argument made by the Seventh Circuit in Kizeart: the “plainly
unreasonable” standard was not the focus of the Supreme Court’s
attention in Booker because the advisory policy statements governing
supervised release were not repugnant to the Constitution.111 After

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that the lower appellate
court correctly applied a presumption of reasonableness to the defendant’s sentence, which
was within the Sentencing Guidelines, and that the appellate court’s reasoning adequately
indicated that defendant’s arguments for a lower sentence were taken into consideration
and rejected); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (holding that although the Court
stated that appellate courts could consider the extent of a deviation and degree of variance
from the Sentencing Guidelines, that the court of appeals had erred in requiring
“extraordinary” circumstances for such deviation); Bolds, 511 F.3d at 568; see also Hall, supra
note 10, at 416–17 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Bolds).
105
Hall, supra note 10, at 418. Although neither Rita nor Gall grappled with an appeal of
a post-revocation sentence, “both cases recognized the confusion and discord displayed by
the circuit courts when reviewing sentencing appeals.” Id. Rita shed some light on the
Supreme Court’s intent in Booker, while “Gall helped clarify appellate court confusion.” Id.
at 419. The Gall Court stated that, because “the Guidelines are now advisory, and appellate
review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are
‘reasonable[,]’ . . . the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to
appellate review of sentencing decisions.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
106
Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted).
109
Hall, supra note 10, at 417. “[T]he court seemingly agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s
analysis in Crudup that the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard of review had not been
displaced by Booker.” Id.
110
Id.
111
United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Booker). “The Sixth
Circuit also looked at the fact that Booker cited several cases that had used the ‘plainly
unreasonable’ standard as examples of the proper standard of review, which was the basis
104
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shifting its attention to discern whether there really was a discrepancy
between the two standards and failing, the court concluded that,
although the Booker Court did not exactly excise the “plainly
unreasonable” standard contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4),
there is no sensible distinction between Booker’s “reasonableness” and
the “plainly unreasonable” standard in §§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4).112
United States v. Edwards, United States v. Cotton, and United States v.
Tyson make it apparent that the Eighth Circuit subscribes to the
“reasonableness” standard of review; yet, in these cases, the court found
no concrete variations between the standards.113 In United States v.
Cotton, the Eighth Circuit held that the pre-Booker standard of review for
supervised release revocations was neither substituted nor discarded in
Booker; rather, it found that the post-Booker standard was equivalent to
the “plainly unreasonable” standard.114 The Cotton court reached this
for the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions.” Hall, supra note 10, at 417
(footnotes omitted).
112
Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (recording the language
at issue).
113
United States v. Edwards, 400 F.3d 591, 592–93 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curium). In
Edwards, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination, holding that, given the
defendant’s admission to violating the terms of his release by unlawfully using a controlled
substance, the trial court had not committed clear error in the findings of fact supporting
the revocation, nor had it abused its discretion in the decision to revoke his supervised
release. Id. at 592. The appellate court also stated that, while Booker significantly changed
the state of federal sentencing, its effect on post-revocation sentences imposed for
violations of supervised release was far less dramatic. Id. The Sentencing Guidelines
associated with supervised release violations were considered advisory even before Booker.
Id. The appellate court determined that the trial court’s sentence was not “unreasonable.”
Id. at 593; United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2005). In Cotton, a defendant
appealed from an order sentencing her to forty-six months of imprisonment upon
revocation of her term of supervised release for possessing and using controlled
substances. Cotton, 399 F.3d at 914. The defendant entered into a plea agreement, making
the basis for revoking supervised release a Grade C violation, the recommended sentence
for which was seven to thirteen months of imprisonment; she was later sentenced to fortysix months. Id. at 915. The appellate court determined that the sentence imposed was not
“unreasonable” as the district court discussed the statutory sentencing goals and gave
multiple satisfactory reasons for its sentence. Id. at 915–17; United States v. Tyson, 413 F.3d
824, 826 (8th Cir. 2005). In Tyson, a defendant appealed from a trial court decision revoking
his probation and imposing a sentence of fifteen months of imprisonment and three years
of supervised release on the ground that he had violated its terms by using cocaine,
assaulting his fiancée, and failing to report to his probation officer. Tyson, 413 F.3d at 825.
The appellate court noted that prior to Booker, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) provided that the court
was to determine whether the sentence imposed was “plainly unreasonable.” Id.
However, the court concluded that Booker had excised § 3742(e) and directed that
sentencing decisions should be reviewed for “reasonableness.” Id. The appellate court
then went on to conclude that the defendant’s sentence was not “unreasonable.” Id. at 826.
114
See Hall, supra note 10, at 415 (discussing that the Eighth Circuit concluded that Booker
had not altered the standard used for review of revocations of supervised release).
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decision by referencing Booker’s citation to an Eighth Circuit case, United
States v. White Face, as an illustration of an appellate court’s capacity to
apply the “reasonableness” standard.115 Using the standard advanced in
Booker, the Eighth Circuit in Cotton found that the “reasonableness”
standard was the same as the standard of review set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e)(4).116 The court declared that the new standard was, in reality,
the same as the one they would have used otherwise.117
United States v. Tedford established that the Tenth Circuit’s current
standard of review is “reasonableness.”118 The Tedford court agreed with
the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Cotton, “that Booker did not change the
‘plainly unreasonable’ standard of review.”119 The court held that when
a trial court imposes a sentence in surfeit of that recommended by the
Chapter Seven policy statements of the Sentencing Guidelines manual,
the sentence shall be affirmed if it was “‘reasoned and reasonable.’”120
Similar to the logic employed by the Cotton court (using White Face), the
Tenth Circuit utilized United States v. Tsosie in its analysis.121
The Eleventh Circuit followed the path laid by the Second, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits in deciding United States v. Sweeting and in adopting
the “reasonableness” standard of review.122 Even though, pre-Booker, the
Eleventh Circuit had reviewed supervised release revocation sentences
under the “plainly unreasonable” standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4), the
court determined that, post-Booker, the proper standard was one of
“reasonableness.”123 Using Tedford and Cotton as examples, the Eleventh
Circuit chose its side—Booker had similarly held out a 2002 Eleventh
115
United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 737–40 (8th Cir. 2004), cited in Booker, 543
U.S. at 262; see Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 262). White Face involved a
post-revocation appeal and was decided by the Eighth Circuit in 2004, “when ‘plainly
unreasonable’ was the unquestioned standard of review.” Hall, supra note 10, at 415.
116
Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916.
117
Id.
118
405 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2005). The defendant in Tedford was sentenced to thirty-six
months of incarceration and a subsequent sixty-month period of supervised release. Id. at
1160. Upon revocation of the supervised release, the trial court imposed a sentence of
forty-eight months of incarceration. Id. The defendant appealed the sentence, contending
that her sentence was “unreasonable” because the district court did not adequately
consider the Chapter Seven policy statements of the Guidelines. Id.; see Hall, supra note 10,
at 415 (discussing Tedford).
119
Hall, supra note 10, at 415.
120
Tedford, 405 F.3d at 1161.
121
United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262;
see Tedford, 405 F.3d at 1161 (deciding to follow the standard articulated by Tsosie). “In
Booker, the Supreme Court cited United States v. Tsosie, a pre-Booker supervised release
revocation appeal in the Tenth Circuit, as an example of the ‘reasonableness’ standard.”
Hall, supra note 10, at 416.
122
437 F.3d 1105, 1105–07 (11th Cir. 2006).
123
Id. at 1106–07.
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Circuit decision, United States v. Cook, as an example of the appropriate
standard of review for cases involving supervised release revocation
sentences.124
2.

Following the “Reasonableness” Approach: Finding a Difference
between the “Plainly Unreasonable” and “Reasonableness”
Standards

Though also choosing to use the “reasonableness” standard of
review, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have implicitly held that
the standards are different.125 While avoiding discussion of the
similarities and variations in the standards, these three circuits have held
that the “reasonableness” standard replaced the “plainly unreasonable”
standard formerly found in § 3742(e)(4).126
Days after Booker was decided, the Second Circuit made its stance
known in United States v. Fleming.127 The Fleming Court reasoned that
§§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4), containing “plainly unreasonable” language,
were not touched by Booker.128 Yet, the Second Circuit held that once the
Supreme Court expunged § 3742(e), it “is fairly understood as requiring
that its announced standard of reasonableness [is] now [to] be applied
not only to [the] review of sentences for which there are [G]uidelines but
also to review of sentences for which there are no applicable
[G]uidelines.”129 The court explained that “reasonableness” is an elastic
notion, and remarked that appellate courts “should exhibit restraint, not
micromanagement” when reviewing post-revocation sentencing

United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262. In
Cook, a defendant appealed her sentence of twenty-four months in prison, imposed by the
district court after her probation was revoked. Id. at 1298. She argued that the sentence
exceeded both her initial sentencing range and the range in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
at 1299. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that under the
plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), as amended, the trial court had the authority to resentence her for violating probation without being restricted to the guideline range
applicable at the time of the initial sentencing hearing. Id. at 1299–1302. The trial court
instead must only comply with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3559. Id. at 1302–03; see Hall, supra note
10, at 416 (expounding on Cook).
125
Simonton, supra note 60, at 136–37.
126
Hall, supra note 10, at 413.
127
397 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005). In Fleming, a defendant appealed a judgment of the district
court sentencing him to two years of imprisonment for his third violation of the conditions
of his term of supervised release. Id. at 96. The court found no error and that the sentence
was “reasonable.” Id.
128
Id. at 99.
129
Id.
124
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appeals.130 The Second Circuit further solidified its position in a later
case, United States v. Lewis.131
Without adding much to the analysis used by the Second Circuit in
Fleming, the Third and Ninth Circuits followed suit. 132 In the germinal
case of United States v. Bungar,133 the Third Circuit held that the proper
standard of review for sentences imposed for violations of supervised
release in its jurisdiction is “reasonableness.”134 In deciding the case in
this manner, the court cited numerous other jurisdictions that had
reached the same conclusion regarding the proper standard.135
In United States v. Miqbel,136 the Ninth Circuit held that, following
Booker, the relevant standard is “reasonableness.”137 The Ninth Circuit
also adopted the reasoning the Second Circuit had used in Fleming
without significant elaboration.138 Miqbel stated, “[this circuit] join[s] the
[United States Courts of Appeals for the] Second and Eighth Circuits in
concluding that Booker’s ‘reasonableness’ standard has displaced the
former ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard in the context of revocation
sentencing.”139 Thus, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have
implicitly recognized a distinction between the “reasonable” and

Id. at 100.
424 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005). In Lewis, a defendant “pleaded guilty to the three charges
of violating her supervised release.” Id. at 242. In response, the district court revoked her
supervised release term and sentenced her principally to a term of imprisonment of
twenty-four months. Id. at 241. She appealed, asserting that remand was required because
the sentence was “plainly unreasonable.” Id. The appellate court stated that, after Booker,
the standard for reviewing sentences imposed for violations of supervised release was that
of “reasonableness.” Id. at 242; see United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussing sentencing under policy statements versus under Sentencing Guidelines).
132
Hall, supra note 10, at 414.
133
478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007). In Bungar, a trial court found the defendant guilty of a
violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Id. at 541. He appealed after the
revocation, contending that the subsequently imposed sixty-month prison term was
“unreasonable.” Id.; see United States v. Smith, 419 Fed. App’x 200, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2011)
(following Bungar).
134
Bungar, 478 F.3d at 541. “The dust has settled, post-Booker, and it is now well
understood that an appellate court reviews a sentence for reasonableness with regard to the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 542 (citations omitted). The court saw “no
reason why that standard should not also apply to a sentence imposed upon a revocation
of supervised release . . . .” Id.
135
Id. at 542 n.1.
136
444 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2006). In Miqbel, a defendant pleaded guilty to violating four
conditions of his term of supervised release. Id. at 1174. The court revoked his supervised
release and imposed the statutory maximum term. Id. The defendant appealed, arguing
that the sentence was “unreasonable.” Id.
137
Id. at 1176 n.5.
138
Simonton, supra note 60, at 140.
139
Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1176 n.5.
130
131
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“plainly unreasonable” standards but have concluded that Booker
anticipated that the former would replace the latter standard.140
Consequently, the circuits are divided both in their postures and in
their ideologies.141 There are inherent strengths and weaknesses in each
stance, but it is important for the judiciary to choose a consistent
standard so that it may be applied in a uniform way to all defendants.142
Against the backdrop of the origin of supervised release, the pre-Booker
standard, and the post-Booker confusion, the following analysis
scrutinizes the positions taken at the appellate level as to what Booker
means for defendants like Luci appealing revocations of supervised
release.143
III. ANALYSIS
Part III primarily focuses on the activity that has taken place within
the circuits post-Booker. It also delves into some of the strengths and
weaknesses of the differing stances and answers whether any
subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the Supreme
Court views to be the correct standard. Part III.A explains why the
“plainly unreasonable” standard is the correct one and attempts to
provide a resolution of potential criticisms of this standard.144 It also
reveals that some of the courts that have chosen “reasonableness” as
their standard have employed logical flaws in their analysis of Booker.145
Part III.A also exposes why the differences between policy statements
and Sentencing Guidelines make a difference in the analysis.146 It further
investigates the topic using canons of construction and statutory
schematics.147 Part III.B asks whether the “plainly unreasonable”
standard survived Booker.148 It also discusses the ease of severability of
Id.
See supra Part II.C–D (detailing both the “plainly unreasonable” and the
“reasonableness” approaches).
142
See infra Part IV (suggesting a model for judicial reasoning in this area).
143
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical); see infra
Part III (analyzing the standards).
144
See infra Part III.A (suggesting why the “plainly unreasonable” standard is correct and
attempting to resolve potential criticisms of the standard).
145
See infra Part III.A.1 (expounding on the correct mode of analysis for the different
standards).
146
See infra Part III.A.2 (differentiating between purely advisory policy statements and
Sentencing Guidelines which were, pre-Booker, binding on the courts).
147
See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the standards using canons of construction and general
statutory interpretation principles).
148
See infra Part III.B (asking whether the “plainly unreasonable” standard survived
Booker and discussing the ease of severability of the section of the SRA that houses the
“plainly unreasonable” standard).
140
141
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the section of the SRA that houses the “plainly unreasonable”
standard.149 Lastly, Part III.C addresses further questions surrounding
the split among the circuits.150 It explains Rita and Gall’s impacts on the
analysis of the correct post-Booker standard of review.151 It then
deciphers whether Booker was trying to create an egalitarian sentencing
system.152 Finally, it seeks to resolve whether a “plainly unreasonable”
standard would result in greater sentencing disparities due to the larger
degree of discretion afforded to trial courts (compared to the
“reasonableness” standard).153
A. The “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard as the Correct Standard
In assessing whether the plainly unreasonable standard is correct,
this Part first delves into the logical flaws present in some circuits’
decisions.154 Next, it compares the Chapter Seven Policy Statements and
Sentencing Guidelines.155
Finally, it briefly explores canons of
construction and statutory schematics.156
1.

The Logical Flaws Employed by Some of the Circuits

Although the position taken by the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits in Tedford, Cotton, and Sweeting has initial allure because, even
before Booker, appellate courts were uncertain how to define the “plainly
unreasonable” standard, this logic does not survive close scrutiny.157 A

See infra Part III.B (discussing the ease of severability of the section of the SRA that
houses the “plainly unreasonable” standard).
150
See infra Part III.C (addressing some further peripheral questions surrounding the
Booker decision and its aftermath).
151
See infra Part III.C.1 (proposing that Rita and Gall did not solve the quandary
confronted by this Note).
152
See infra Part III.C.2 (suggesting that egalitarian sentencing was not Booker’s goal).
153
See infra Part III.C.3 (dealing with the dilemma of sentencing disparities under the
“reasonableness” standard).
154
See infra Part III.A.1 (exploring weaknesses in some circuit court decisions).
155
See infra Part III.A.2 (examining the policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines).
156
See infra Part III.A.3 (dealing with various aspects of statutory construction).
157
See generally United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2006) (providing a
partial basis for the Eleventh Circuit’s position); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159
(10th Cir. 2005) (providing a partial basis for the Tenth Circuit’s position); United States v.
Cotton, 399 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2005) (providing a partial basis for the Eighth Circuit’s
position); Simonton, supra note 60, at 138 (“Tedford, Cotton, and Sweeting reach a clear
definition of the standard by concluding that it is nothing more than a paraphrase of the
normal reasonableness standard.”). The appellate courts in these cases decided that 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” standard was synonymous with Booker’s
“reasonableness” standard. Simonton, supra note 60, at 138. The courts made this
determination by noting that Booker had cited earlier cases from their respective circuits
149
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more careful look at the Booker passage relied on by the Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits demonstrates that they misinterpreted the reason
for Justice Breyer’s citation to White Face, Tsosie, and other similar
cases.158 In referencing “reasonableness” standards, Booker was actually
recognizing a difference between 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly
unreasonable” standard and bare “reasonableness.”159 “Reasonableness”
was the barometer that governed departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines before 2003, “when Congress amended the statute to provide
for de novo review of such decisions.”160 Booker actually referred to
multiple standards, and, consequently, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits were wrong to assume that because Booker referenced cases from

apparently applying the “plainly unreasonable” standard as illustrations of an appellate
court’s capacity in applying the “reasonableness” standard. Id. at 137.
Nor do we share the dissenters’ doubts about the practicality of a
“reasonableness” standard of review. . . . The Act has long required
their use in important sentencing circumstances—both on review of
departures, and on review of sentences imposed where there was no
applicable Guideline. Together, these cases account for about 16.7% of
sentencing appeals. . . . See also, e.g., United States v. White Face, United
States v. Tsosie. That is why we think it fair (and not, in Justice
SCALIA’s words, a “gross exaggeratio[n],” to assume judicial
familiarity with a “reasonableness” standard. And that is why we
believe that appellate judges will prove capable of facing with greater
equanimity than would Justice SCALIA what he calls the “daunting
prospect” of applying such a standard across the board.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262–63 (2005) (citations omitted); see generally United
States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004) (providing a source for the Eighth Circuit’s
arguments), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir.
2004) (providing a source for the Tenth Circuit’s arguments), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 262.
158
Simonton, supra note 60, at 138; see White Face, 383 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added)
(“When there is no applicable sentencing guideline, as in the case of a revocation sentence,
we review to determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable.”); Tsosie, 376 F.3d at
1218 (quoting United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“Although the policy
statements regarding revocation of supervised release are advisory rather than mandatory
in nature, they must be ‘considered by the trial court in its deliberations concerning
punishment for violation of conditions of supervised release.’”). If the trial court “imposes
a sentence in excess of that recommended in Chapter 7, ‘we will not reverse if it can be
determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable.’” Id. (emphasis added).
“Mr. Tsosie argues the district court’s decision was plainly unreasonable . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added); see also Simonton, supra note 60, at 138 (explaining how the Supreme Court in
Booker gave instances of the appellate courts’ wide-ranging acquaintance with and
knowledge of “reasonableness” standards (not standard)). Booker cited cases—including
White Face and Tsosie—that apply either 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (“reasonableness” standard)
or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) (“plainly unreasonable” standard). Id. (citing Booker at 261–63).
The Booker Court then went on to prove that appellate courts recurrently utilized a variety
of different “reasonableness” standards. Id.
159
See id. (pointing out the importance of the usage of the plural “standards”).
160
Id. at 139.
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those circuits that used the “plainly unreasonable” benchmark, it was
likening “plainly unreasonable” to “reasonableness.”161
2.

Policy Statements v. Guidelines

A second potential criticism of the “plainly unreasonable” standard
is the argument that it may not make sense for judges, in theory, to have
greater discretion in post-revocation sentencing than in everyday,
ordinary sentencing of defendants.162 This is because, after Booker,
advisory Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements apply similarly to
defendants.163 Nonetheless, this argument does not recognize that there
is still a difference between the Sentencing Guidelines governing
ordinary sentences and the advisory statements governing postrevocation sentences.164
The Chapter Seven policy statements are more “brief and
rudimentary” than the Sentencing Guidelines that apply to original
sentences, and they do not “take account of the myriad individual factors
that could warrant a higher or lower postrevocation sentence . . . .”165
Id. at 138–39. Justice Breyer, concurring, recognized two “reasonableness” standards,
and even he specified that it was 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)’s reasonableness standard (not 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” standard) that was the guide for Booker’s
reasonableness standard. Id. at 139. “Although Booker reasons that courts’ familiarity with
the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard may assist with their application of the new standard,
the opinion does not suggest that the relationship between the two standards goes any
deeper.” Id. at 140. Therefore, “the approach taken by these courts does not accurately
resolve the question of what becomes of the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard after Booker.”
Id.
162
Id. at 148–49 (using the “plainly unreasonable” standard for post-revocation review
and the “reasonableness” standard for ordinary appellate review of sentencing
determinations).
163
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing
Guidelines were purely advisory and that trial courts were required to take the Sentencing
Guidelines into consideration, but were not bound by them); supra note 46 and
accompanying text (explaining that the policy statements for sentences stemming from
revocations of supervised release were, from the very beginning, purely advisory).
164
See United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 763–66 (8th Cir. 1992) (detailing the
difference between “general policy statements” and the Sentencing Guidelines).
165
Simonton, supra note 60, at 149. The Sentencing Guidelines Manual notes that:
Given the relatively narrow ranges of incarceration available in many
cases, combined with the potential difficulty in obtaining information
necessary to determine specific offense characteristics, the Commission
felt that it was undesirable at this time to develop [G]uidelines that
attempt to distinguish, in detail, the wide variety of behavior that can
lead to revocation. Indeed, with the relatively low ceilings set by
statute, revocation policy statements that attempted to delineate with
great particularity the gradations of conduct leading to revocation
would frequently result in a sentence at the statutory maximum
penalty.
161
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The policy statements were designed to give the district courts more
discretion in post-revocation sentencing than in original sentencing. 166
This inherent flexibility distinguishes advisory policy statements from
binding (pre-Booker) Sentencing Guidelines.167 Consequently, trial courts
should still be able to exercise more discretion in sentencing a violator of
a term of supervised release than in sentencing a Guideline offense
violator.168
3.

Canons of Construction and Statutory Schematics

Judge Posner’s sentiments in Kizeart about the incredible difficulty of
differentiating and making fine-tooth distinctions between standards of
review may also pose hurdles for the “plainly unreasonable” standard.169
However, it is not up to appellate courts to dispose of intentional
language inserted by the legislature and left in the statutory scheme after
Booker.170 A classical canon of statutory construction directs courts to
give full effect to every word in a statute so long as it does not render it
contradictory.171 Therefore, despite the general trouble of distinguishing

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2009).
166
See Simonton, supra note 60, at 149 (discussing the enhanced flexibility built into the
discretionary policy statements).
167
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009) (noting the binding
nature of Sentencing Guidelines).
168
See Simonton, supra note 60, at 149 (focusing on the intrinsic differences between
Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements).
169
United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007); see supra note 86 (elaborating
on canons of statutory construction).
170
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675. “[W]hile appellate courts understand and can implement the
difference between deferential and nondeferential review, the making of finer gradations
within the category of deferential review strains judicial competence . . . .” Id. It is true
that
[t]he gradations exist formally: there is clear-error review, substantialevidence review, review for rationality (as of jury verdicts, where the
test is whether any rational trier of fact could have arrived at the jury’s
verdict), arbitrary-and-capricious review, abuse-of-discretion review,
ultra-narrow review of credibility determinations based on a witness’s
demeanor, and more.
Id. Yet in a majority of the cases, without regard to “the formal gradation of deferential
review, the appellate judges are merely giving the benefit of the doubt to the trier of fact or
other first-level decision maker . . . .” Id. “So while we must do our best to mark any
gradations prescribed by Congress, we cannot promise great success in the endeavor.” Id.
171
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“It
is our duty to give effect . . . to every clause and word of a statute. . . . We are thus
reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.”); see also cases cited supra
note 86 (discussing statutory construction).
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between the two potential standards, “plainly unreasonable” is the more
convincing position.172
B. Did the “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard Survive Booker?
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have reasoned that Booker did not
replace the “plainly unreasonable” standard based on the propositions
that “the plainly unreasonable standard exists in parts of [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3742 that Booker did not touch, and second, unlike the [Sentencing]
[G]uidelines that apply to ordinary sentences, Chapter [Seven] has
always been merely advisory and therefore did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.”173 Other segments of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 besides § 3742(e)(4)
(the section severed and excised by Booker) contain the “plainly
unreasonable” standard.174
Since Booker, appellate courts have continued to apply the other
standards that are found in both 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a) and (e), including
3742(a)(1), (a)(2), (e)(1) and (e)(2), which allow for appellate review of
sentences resulting from “an incorrect application of the [S]entencing
[G]uidelines.”175 The implicit reason why courts have continued to

See Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675 (supporting the “plainly unreasonable” standard).
See Simonton, supra note 60, at 140 (explaining that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have
found that Booker had no effect on the pertinent standard).
174
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit
explained the standard this way:
[T]he structure of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742 suggests that “plainly
unreasonable” is the proper standard of review for revocation
sentences. Under [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(a)(4)—a provision not invalidated
by Booker—a defendant sentenced for violating supervised release is
authorized to appeal only on the ground that his sentence is “plainly
unreasonable.”
Id. at 437. The court inferred from this provision that revocation sentences should be
reviewed under this same standard. Id. at 437–38. “It would seem incongruous that a
defendant limited to asserting that his revocation sentence is ‘plainly unreasonable,’ would
be allowed to argue that his sentence should be reversed because it is ‘unreasonable.’” Id.
at 437. Pertinent “[G]uideline commentary and statutory provisions also suggest that
revocation sentences should not be treated exactly the same as original sentences.” Id.; see
United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “Booker left [18
U.S.C. §§] 3742(a), 3742(b), and 3742(f) on the books”); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2009) (noting that the imposition of an apt
punishment for any new criminal activity is not the main goal of a revocation sentence,
rather, the sentence imposed following revocation is meant to sanction the violator for
failing to abide by the conditions of his or her supervised release).
175
18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (a)(2) and 3742
(e)(1), (e)(2) provide:
§ 3742. Review of a sentence
172
173
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apply these sections post-Booker, while shying away from the application
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(4) and (e)(4), is that “the latter contains something
that more closely resembles a standard of review, and therefore appears
to conflict more readily with Booker’s reasonableness standard.”176 Yet,
because Booker did not eliminate all mention of “plainly unreasonable” in
the statutory scheme, the standard lives on post-Booker.177
Both Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent
suggest that the only part of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) that Booker sought to
remove was the de novo review provision, which made the Sentencing
Guidelines even more mandatory than they had been before the 2003
amendments to the section, and which was found to violate the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, not § 3742(e)(4)’s “plainly
unreasonable” standard.178 Therefore, the Court did not intend Booker to
eliminate the “plainly unreasonable” standard.179
(a) APPEAL BY A DEFENDANT.—A defendant may file a notice of appeal
in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the
sentence—
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
[S]entencing [G]uidelines . . . .
....
(e) . . . Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine
whether the sentence—
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
[S]entencing [G]uidelines . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)–(a)(2), (e)(1)–(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009); see Simonton, supra note 60,
at 142 (noting the activity in the appellate courts).
176
Simonton, supra note 60, at 142.
177
Id.
178
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). The Booker Court related that the
application of these criteria indicates that they “must sever and excise two” provisions:
“the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure) and the
provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of
departures from the applicable Guidelines range.” Id. (citation omitted). With the excision
of these two statutory sections “(and statutory cross-references to the two sections
consequently invalidated), the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s constitutional
requirements.” Id. “[T]he majority creates a new category of cases in which this Court may
invalidate any part or parts of a statute (and add others) when it concludes that Congress
would have preferred a modified system to administering the statute in compliance with
the Constitution.” Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
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Furthermore, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have doubted
that Booker’s “reasonableness” standard applied to post-revocation
sentences, as these sentences were never administered according to the
troublesome mandatory Sentencing Guidelines; the sentencing for postrevocation appeals “was discretionary before Booker and is discretionary
after it.”180 While the Booker Court expressed its holding as “a ‘severance
and excision’ of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e), it never stated that it was declaring
the provision invalid in . . . appeals from [non-standard Sentencing]
Guideline
sentences. . . . Thus,
the
question
becomes
whether . . . [Booker’s] severance . . . should apply to postrevocation
sentencing” as well.181 Booker suggests that the answer is no.182
Booker did not directly address whether it could sever 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e)’s function in ordinary sentencing appeals (for which it was
found to be unconstitutional) from its application to post-revocation
sentencing appeals.183 “However, it is too simplistic and mechanical to
assume . . . that the Court’s invalidation of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e) extends
to the postrevocation context just because the Court used the words
‘severed’ and ‘excised’ in the context of ordinary sentencing appeals.”184
Conversely, Booker stated that it was necessary to “retain those portions
of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of ‘functioning
independently,’ and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in
enacting the statute,” and that courts need to abstain from nullifying any
more of a statute or statutory scheme than is required. 185
Because the policy statements that apply to post-revocation
sentences are only advisory provisions that suggest, not require, the
imposition of particular sentences, post-revocation sentences have never
posed the problems of mandatory Sentencing Guidelines that were the
focus of the Booker Court; therefore, the severance of the unconstitutional

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
179
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
180
United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 817 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rush, 132
F.App’x 54, 56 (7th Cir. 2005).
181
See Simonton, supra note 60, at 144 (posing a question that cuts to the heart of the split
among the circuits).
182
See Vermeule, supra note 60, at 1950 n.26 (stating that courts can sever uses or portions
of a statute that are unconstitutional from applications that are valid and can continue to
apply the constitutional portions), cited in Booker, 543 U.S. at 247.
183
See Simonton, supra note 60, at 145 (noting that Booker did not address the statutory
construction issue that contributed to the creation of the split among the circuits).
184
Id. at 145.
185
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005) (citations omitted).
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portions of the statutory scheme need not affect the post-revocation
policy statements and their corresponding standard of review.186
C. Further Questions Surrounding the Issue of Choosing a Standard
Part III.C addresses some further peripheral questions surrounding
the Booker decision and its aftermath.
These include:
whether
subsequent cases have clarified what the Supreme Court sees as the
correct standard; whether Booker was attempting to create egalitarian
sentencing; and lastly, whether the “plainly unreasonable” standard
results in larger sentencing disparities due to the greater discretion
afforded to trial courts.187
1.

Did Rita and Gall Resolve What the Standard Should Be?

In Bolds, the Sixth Circuit used two post-Booker decisions, Rita v.
United States and Gall v. United States, to decide the proper standard of
review for revocations of supervised release.188
The Bolds court
See id. at 233. Booker stated:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory
provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted
the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a
sentence within a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the
constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been
avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the SRA the provisions
that make the [Sentencing] Guidelines binding on district judges; it is
that circumstance that makes the Court’s answer to the second
question presented possible. For when a trial judge exercises his
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the
judge deems relevant. The [Sentencing] Guidelines as written,
however, are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all
judges.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481
(2000) (noting that it is possible for judges to exercise discretion within the confines of
statutory guidance and the Constitution).
187
See infra Part III.C.1–3 (discussing emerging issues in choosing a uniform standard).
188
United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 573–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). In Rita, the Defendant
was convicted of perjury; and, on appeal, he asserted that his sentence was unreasonable.
551 U.S. at 340. The Gall Court stated that in two cases argued last term the Court
“considered the standard that courts of appeals should apply when reviewing the
reasonableness of sentences imposed by district judges.” 552. U.S. at 40. “Rita v. United
States, involved a sentence within the range recommended by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351). The Court “held that when
a district judge’s discretionary decision in a particular case accords with the sentence the
186
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determined that the other circuits’ analyses failed to fill in all of the
fissures left by Booker.189 “For this, the Sixth Circuit looked to the recent
opinions by the Supreme Court in Rita and Gall.”190 However, neither
Rita nor Gall dealt specifically with reviews of revocation of supervised
release; both cases, though, acknowledged the bewilderment and
dissonance of the appellate courts reviewing sentencing appeals postBooker.191
Though it could be argued that Rita provided some insight into
Booker (i.e., that Booker replaced the de novo standard of review required
by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) with an abuse-of-discretion standard, the
“reasonableness” review), this is an improper inference. 192 That is
because Rita was not considering a sentence imposed for revocation of
supervised release.193
The Supreme Court was actually, in fact,
considering a sentence imposed for testifying falsely before a grand jury,
a traditional Sentencing Guideline offense.194
The Bolds court further looked to Gall to attempt to discern the
correct standard.195 The Bolds court concluded that the majority of the
Supreme Court in Gall held that Booker had made it clear that the familiar
abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review
of all sentencing decisions.196 However, dissenting in Gall, Justice Alito
stated that Booker fell short of “explain[ing] exactly what it meant by a
system of ‘advisory’ [Sentencing] [G]uidelines or by ‘reasonableness’

United States Sentencing Commission deems appropriate ‘in the mine run of cases,’ the
court of appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable.” Id. The Gall Court found
that the appellate court’s rule requiring “proportional” justifications for departures was
inconsistent with Booker. Hall, supra note 10, at 419. Under the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard that applied to review of sentencing decisions, the appellate court had
failed to give due deference to the district court’s reasoned and reasonable decision. Gall,
552 U.S. at 40; see Hall, supra note 10, at 416–17 (discussing Gall).
189
Bolds, 511 F.3d at 577; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Bolds).
190
Hall, supra note 10, at 418.
191
Id.
192
Rita, 551 U.S. at 340; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (“By shedding light on the Court’s
intent in Booker, Rita provided the Sixth Circuit with guidance in determining the proper
standard of review for sentences imposed after revocation of supervised release.”).
“Finally, Rita and supporting amici here claim that the [Sentencing] Guidelines sentence is
not reasonable under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) because it expressly declines to consider various
personal characteristics of the defendant . . . . Rita did not make this argument below, and
we shall not consider it.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 360.
193
Id.
194
Id. “[T]he crimes at issue are perjury and obstruction of justice. In essence those
offenses involved the making of knowingly false, material statements under oath before a
grand jury, thereby impeding its criminal investigation.” Id. at 359.
195
United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 38).
196
Id.; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Gall and Bolds).
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review, and [that] the opinion is open to different interpretations.” 197
Based on Gall’s statement that, as “the [Sentencing] Guidelines are now
advisory, and appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to
determining whether they are ‘reasonable,’ . . . [and] the familiar abuseof-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of
sentencing decisions,” the Bolds court found that Booker directed
appellate courts to apply the “reasonableness” standard to review
supervised release revocation sentences.198
2.

Was Booker Trying to Create an Egalitarian Sentencing System?

Some commentators have read Booker as endeavoring “to create an
egalitarian system by which all sentences are governed by advisory
[Sentencing] Guidelines and are judged by the same standard of review
on appeal.”199 However, Booker’s true aim was to ensure that trial courts
had more discretion, not less; reducing the discretion afforded district
courts on appeals of revocations of supervised release is actually
contrary to the spirit of Booker’s holding.200 “Such a reading of Booker
would place the loose, flexible grid system envisioned by the Sentencing
Commission for revocation sentences on the same level as the precise
[Sentencing] [G]uideline system devised for original sentences.” 201 The
inherent differences between Sentencing Guidelines, which were
mandatory pre-Booker, and advisory policy statements, which have never
been mandatory, lends credence to this conclusion. Plainly, curtailing
the discretion of trial courts by imposing a less deferential standard of
review for examining post-revocation sentences contradicts Booker’s
intention of broadening the sentencing discretion of district courts “and
197
Gall, 552 U.S. at 62 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting); see Hall, supra note 10, at 418
(discussing the dissent in Gall).
198
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46; Bolds, 511 F.3d at 575; see Hall, supra note 10, at 418 (discussing Rita
and Gall).
199
Simonton, supra note 60, at 150 (emphasis added); see Bissonnette, supra note 64, at
1497 (reading Booker to create egalitarian sentencing); see also WHITMAN, supra note 64, at
53–54 (evidencing an emerging egalitarian approach towards sentencing by liberals in
Congress).
200
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 n.9 (4th Cir. 2006). The Cudrup court
explained that:
It would be an odd result if Booker were interpreted to reduce the level
of discretion district courts have always had to devise revocation
sentences under policy statements that have uniformly been deemed
non-binding while giving district courts more discretion to impose
original sentences under [G]uidelines that were deemed binding until
Booker.
Id.
201
Id.
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ignores the differences in structure between the Chapter [Seven] policy
statements and the ordinary [Sentencing] Guidelines.”202
3.

Does a “Plainly Unreasonable” Standard Result in Greater
Sentencing Disparities Due to the Larger Degree of Discretion
Afforded to Trial Courts?

The concern of unwarranted sentencing disparities due to the greater
degree of discretion awarded to trial courts by allowing them to continue
to use the “plainly unreasonable” standard can be addressed by an
examination of the context of revocations of supervised release. 203 There
are low statutory ceilings on sentences for violations of supervised
release.204 Furthermore, supervised release is more akin to probation

Simonton, supra note 60, at 150.
See id. at 149 (stating that giving trial courts more discretion in the context of
revocations of supervised release poses a good deal less risk of sentencing inconsistencies,
than it would in the normal sentencing context due to “the low statutory ceilings on most
postrevocation sentences”). “The vast majority of postrevocation sentences are for
violations of supervised release.” Id.
204
Id. There are different grades of supervised release violations:
§ 7B1.1. Classification of Violations (Policy Statement)
(a) There are three grades of probation and supervised release
violations:
(1) Grade A Violations—conduct constituting (A) a federal, state,
or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year that (i) is a crime of violence, (ii) is a controlled
substance offense, or (iii) involves possession of a firearm or
destructive device of a type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or (B)
any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding twenty years;
(2) Grade B Violations—conduct constituting any other federal,
state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year;
(3) Grade C Violations—conduct constituting (A) a federal, state,
or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year
or less; or (B) a violation of any other condition of supervision.
(b) Where there is more than one violation of the conditions of
supervision, or the violation includes conduct that constitutes more
than one offense, the grade of the violation is determined by the
violation having the most serious grade.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009). These grades correspond to the
level of punishment the defendant will receive:
§ 7B1.4. Term of Imprisonment (Policy Statement)
(a) The range of imprisonment applicable upon revocation is set forth
in the following table:
202
203
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than imprisonment, making violations less serious than those of other
sentences.205 According to the Sentencing Commission, their decision to
enact sweeping policy statements instead of strict, meticulous Sentencing
Guidelines was based in part on the constricted ranges provided for

Revocation Table
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category*

Grade of
Violation

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Grade C

3–9

4–10

5–11

6–12

7–13

8–14

Grade B

4–10

6–12

8–14

12–18

18–24

21–27

30–37

33–41

Grade A

(1)

Except as provided in subdivision (2) below:

12–18
(2)

15–21

18–24

24–30

Where the defendant was on probation or supervised release as a
result of a sentence for a Class A felony:
24–30

27–33

30–37

37–46

46–57

51–63.

Id.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A (2009). The Guidelines stipulate
the following:
The conditions of supervised release authorized by statute are the
same as those for a sentence of probation, except for intermittent
confinement. (Intermittent confinement is available for a sentence of
probation, but is available as a condition of supervised release only for
a violation of a condition of supervised release.) When the court finds
that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, it may
continue the defendant on supervised release, with or without
extending the term or modifying the conditions, or revoke supervised
release and impose a term of imprisonment.
The periods of
imprisonment authorized by statute for a violation of the conditions of
supervised release generally are more limited, however, than those
available for a violation of the conditions of probation.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)).
205
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sentencing violators of the terms of their supervised release.206 Strict
Sentencing Guidelines would have laid out specific progressions leading
to revocation of supervised release and would have instituted another
form of punishment.207
Considering all of these issues, this Note proposes a definitive
standard for resolving appeals of revocations of supervised release: the
standard adopted by a minority of the circuits—“plainly
unreasonable.”208 The examination of many of the problems with the
analyses performed by some of the circuits, namely the Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, strengthens this proposition. 209 The differences
between policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines also weigh into
the debate.210 Furthermore, the canon of construction, which directs the
courts to give full effect to every word in a statute so long as it does not
render it contradictory, dictates that it is not up to the courts to dispose
of intentional language inserted by the legislature and left in the
statutory scheme after Booker.211
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Circuit splits, such as the one presented above, are detrimental to
our system of justice and undermine the credibility of the judiciary.212 It
is of paramount importance that such splits are resolved and consistent
standards applied.213 The following model approach, the proposed
application note to the Sentencing Guidelines, and explanation and
policy arguments strive to choose the best alternative and propose a
method for instituting this choice. 214

Simonton, supra note 60, at 134; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A
(2009).
207
Simonton, supra note 60, at 134; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A
(2009).
208
See infra Part IV (proffering “plainly unreasonable” as the best standard).
209
See supra Part III.A (attempting to resolve potential criticisms of the “plainly
unreasonable” standard).
210
See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining the difference between binding Sentencing
Guidelines (pre-Booker) and advisory policy statements).
211
See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of construction and statutory schematics).
212
See supra Parts II–III (outlining and analyzing the split among the circuits).
213
See infra Part IV.B (proposing “plainly unreasonable” as the rightful standard and
stating the policy arguments in favor of a resolution of the split among the circuits in this
area).
214
See infra Part IV (advancing the “plainly unreasonable” standard).
206
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A. The Plainly Unreasonable Approach and How to Apply It
Currently, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits utilize the “plainly
reasonable” standard for reviewing post-revocation sentences, though it
is the minority position among the appellate courts.215 This uniform
standard is the best choice given a balancing of the inherent strengths
and weaknesses of both standards.216 As it is unclear which portion of
the SRA Booker meant to excise, there would otherwise be construction
and interpretation issues, and there are inherent problems with using a
“reasonableness” standard; thus, “plainly unreasonable” is the best
choice.217
Even though the differences between the two standards may, in
practice, be difficult to distinguish, the courts should attempt to give the
words their full effect, as they were purposefully inserted by Congress.218
This approach would pay respect to the difference between
“reasonableness” and “plainly unreasonable,” and return the
standardization and regularity to sentencing that existed under the SRA,
but which, post-Booker, has proven elusive.
While it is important that the appellate courts apply a uniform
standard when deciding similar cases, the judiciary should endeavor to
more succinctly define what that standard is to ensure consistent results.
The Kizeart court expounded on this difficulty, and noted that the
difference between the “reasonableness” standard and the “plainly
unreasonable” standard is “slight.”219 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
went on to attempt to explain the fine nuances that exist in the scale of
deference applied in different types of cases. 220 While they have
215
See supra Part II.C (explaining the “plainly unreasonable” approach and
methodologies and theories of the subscribing circuits).
216
See supra Part III (focusing on what activity has taken place in the circuits post-Booker
and delving into some of the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches, and
whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the Supreme Court
views to be the correct approach).
217
See infra Part IV (proffering “plainly unreasonable” as the best standard).
218
See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing canons of construction and statutory schematics).
219
United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007).
220
Id. at 675. The court explained that many gradations exist including: clear-error
review, substantial-evidence standards, review for rationality, arbitrary-and-capricious
review, abuse-of-discretion review, an ultra-narrow type review of credibility
determinations, and others. Id. However, “regardless of the formal gradation of
deferential review,” the appellate judge is focused mainly on how much of the benefit of
the doubt to give to the lower court decision maker. Id. This depends, in addition to the
formal standard of review, on “the nature of the issue and the institutional competence of
the first-level decision maker relative to that of the appellate court.” Id. However, in this
entire process, an appellate court must do its best to recognize and effectuate any
gradations set down by Congress. Id.
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recognized that there is a difference between the two standards,
implementing this difference has proven difficult.221 This is true even
though there are strong reasons why a different standard of review
should be applied to appeals of revocations of supervised release than to
appeals from sentences imposed under the once mandatory, now
discretionary, Sentencing Guidelines.222 The Kizeart court attempted to
give a guidepost for sorting through and pithily defining the “plainly
unreasonable” standard.223 The Seventh Circuit borrowed from “the
present class of cases [which utilize] the narrowest judicial review of
judgments we know, and that is judicial review of the sanctions imposed
by prison disciplinary boards.”224 The appellate court concluded that
“[s]uch sanctions must indeed be ‘plainly’ unreasonable to be set
aside.”225
The following is a proposed sequential analysis of an appeal of a
revocation of supervised release, taking into account the Seventh
Circuit’s guidepost of analogizing these types of determinations to the
familiar standard of review used in examining sanctions imposed by
prison disciplinary review boards. This position also borrows from the
Fourth Circuit’s sequential outline developed in Crudup.226 This Note
proposes that the following sequential analysis be added as an
application note to the policy statement governing violations of
supervised release within Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines:

See Sch. Dist. of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing Aegerter v. City of Delafield, 174 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1999)) (stating that “‘it is
possible, though not always easy,’ to distinguish among the canonical standards of review,
such as substantial evidence and clear error” review, and acknowledging the “‘skepticism’”
which has emerged “‘in the past about the ability of judges to apply more than a few
standards of review’”).
222
See supra Part III (weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches
and asking whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed light on what the
Supreme Court views to be the correct approach). These strong reasons include: that there
are important inherent differences between policy statements and Sentencing Guidelines,
that canons of construction and statutory schematics require differentiation between the
advisory policy statements and the previously mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, and that
reducing the amount of discretion given to trial courts in handing out supervised release
revocation sentences is contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s holding in Booker. See
supra Part III (presenting the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches).
223
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.
224
Id; see cases cited supra note 86 (discussing the ability of courts to distinguish among
different standards of review).
225
Kizeart, 505 F.3d at 675.
226
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006) (requiring a
reviewing court to first determine if the trial court’s sentence is “reasonable,” and only
moving on to “plainly unreasonable” scrutiny if the sentence does not pass the
“reasonableness” threshold).
221
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Application Note:227
1.

In deciding whether a sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” the first step
shall be to determine whether the sentence is “reasonable.”228 Both
procedure and substance are entered into the equation, as well as the
distinct nature of supervised release revocation sentences. 229 The court
undertakes this analysis keeping in mind the deferential nature of the
standard, as well as the Chapter 7 policy statements and statutory
constraints of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
pertinent to revocation sentences.230 The appellate court, in due course,

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 (2009). The proposed application note is
italicized and is the contribution of the author.
228
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 (2009).
229
Id.
According to [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(e), in devising a revocation sentence
the district court is not authorized to consider whether the revocation
sentence “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s]
respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the
offense,’’ [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(A), or whether there are other ‘‘kinds
of sentences available,’’ [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(3).
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
230
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7
(2009). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any
amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments
issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect
on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release,
the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the
227
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has extensive discretion to rescind its sentence and impose a new
sentence.231 Only if the appellate court determines that a revocation of
supervised release is not “reasonable” should it turn to the second step
of analyzing whether such sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” 232 If the
sentence satisfies the requirement of “reasonableness,” it should be
affirmed without further scrutiny; if the revocation of supervised
release sentence is substantively or procedurally “unreasonable,” then
the appellate court must decide if it is “plainly” so.233 “Plain” is
synonymous with apparent or evident, and, while a revocation of a
supervised release sentence must “bear some indicia of reliability,” it
need only cross a “meager threshold.”234
Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28,
United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to
such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments
issued under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments
made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of
whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p)
of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553.
231
United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Pelensky, 129
F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997). The Lewis court also rightly held that “a court’s statement of its
reasons for going beyond non-binding policy statements in imposing a sentence after
revoking a defendant’s supervised release term need not be as specific as has been required
when courts departed from [G]uidelines that were, before Booker, considered to be
mandatory.” Lewis, 424 F.3d at 245; see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–39.
232
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–39.
233
Id.
234
The definition of “plainly unreasonable” from the judicial review of the sanctions
imposed by prison disciplinary boards proves useful at this juncture. Id.; see Scruggs v.
Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal of an inmate’s habeas
appeal stemming from discipline imposed by a prison’s Conduct Adjustment Board, as the
disciplinary decision was “supported by at least ‘some evidence’”); United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). The Moulden court held that the court, postCrudup, “must first determine whether the sentence is unreasonable.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at
656 (citing Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). The court additionally stated that:
This initial inquiry takes a more “deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion” than
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B. Commentary
Confusion and disparate standards among the appellate courts in the
federal system is detrimental to our system of justice, which rests on
ideals of fairness and even-handed application of the laws to our
citizenry. As reviews of revocations of supervised release are criminal
matters, striking at the heart of constitutional ideals, coherence is
particularly valuable. Moreover, “[t]he standards of review can function
as intended only if the meaning of each standard is understood
consistently among judges of the reviewing courts.” 235
It follows that a uniform standard must be chosen and applied, with
courts paying acute attention to the import of the particular standard
involved in that case. The standard of review is significant, as evidenced
by the fact that the rules of most courts specifically require the appellant
to state the applicable standard of review for each issue addressed in its
brief.236 It is vital that courts do not forget that distinguishing among
levels of deference is important, and that their duty is to attempt to give
its significance the full force intended by the legislature. It is necessary
to gather all of the circuits onto the same page, and to require them to
apply a consistent standard of review for revocations of supervised
release.
Counter to the theory subscribed to by a majority of the appellate
courts deciding the issue, Booker did not excise the “plainly
unreasonable” standard traditionally applied to sentencing appeals of
supervised release revocations.237 Altering the pre-Booker “plainly
reasonableness review for [Sentencing] [G]uidelines sentences. Of
course, as always, the sentencing court must consider the policy
statements contained in Chapter 7, including the policy statement
range, as “helpful assistance,” and must also consider the applicable
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. At the same time, however, the
sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a defendant’s
[supervised release] and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. The court must provide a statement of reasons
for the sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but
this statement “need not be as specific as has been required” for
departing from a traditional guidelines range. Only if this modified
“reasonableness” analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence was
unreasonable, do we ask whether it is “plainly” so, “relying on the
definition of ‘plain’ [used] in our ‘plain’ error analysis”—that is,
“clear” or “obvious.”
Id. at 656–57 (citations omitted).
235
Storm, supra note 93, at 89 (noting that the standard of review used does matter).
236
Id. at 74.
237
Simonton, supra note 60, at 153. “Although the possibility of replacing the rather
‘unusual’ ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard with a more familiar reasonableness standard is
understandably alluring to these courts, Booker provides little support for such a result.” Id.
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unreasonable” standard is contradictory to Congress’s intent, as shown
by its side-by-side comparison of the two different “standards of review
in the pre-2003 version of [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e).”238 Furthermore, such a
conclusion “overlooks the fact that courts can easily sever [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3742(e)’s application to postrevocation [sic] sentences from its other
applications and therefore salvage the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard
for future use.”239 Rather than erasing the “plainly unreasonable”
standard, appellate courts should make an effort to tangibly define and
use the standard, which is, as demonstrated by the minority of circuits,
capable of application.
V. CONCLUSION
United States v. Booker impacted the United States sentencing system
in a forceful way. Two chief questions raised by the appellate courts in
this area have proven difficult to answer, though not impossible to
resolve: first, whether the Booker Court intended to replace the “plainly
unreasonable” standard with the “reasonableness” standard in
reviewing revocations of supervised release, and, second, whether the
two standards are meaningfully different. 240
This Note has analyzed the current state of the resulting split among
the circuits as well as the differing standards currently being utilized in
the federal appellate system.241 Although a majority of the circuits have
gravitated toward “reasonableness,” they internally diverge regarding
whether there is a workable difference between the “plainly
unreasonable” and the “reasonableness” standards.242 A minority of the
circuits have conversely chosen the “plainly unreasonable” review as
their standard.243 Furthermore, additional circuits have not addressed
this matter or chosen a standard that they see as appropriate for
reviewing appeals of revocations of supervised release.244 There are
strengths and weaknesses in both the majority and minority standards,

Id.
Id.
240
See supra Part II.B (expanding on these two important questions stemming from
Booker).
241
See supra Part III (focusing on what activity has taken place in the circuits post-Booker
and discussing some of the strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches, and
whether any subsequent Supreme Court cases have shed any light on what the Supreme
Court views to be the correct approach).
242
See supra Part II.D (analyzing and expounding upon the current majority standard).
243
See supra Part II.C (analyzing the current minority standard).
244
See supra Part II.D (noting that not all circuits have undertaken a review of the
standards nor decided on a correct approach).
238
239
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and it remains unclear what the Supreme Court views to be the correct
guidepost.245
As the minority of the federal circuits has correctly decided, the
“plainly unreasonable” standard lives on after Booker.246 This becomes
clearer upon a close inspection of the several problems intrinsic to the
analyses used by the circuits that have chosen the “reasonableness”
standard.247 The flaws of the “reasonableness” standard render it the
weaker of the two positions, and thus “plainly unreasonable” is the
correct standard of review applicable to revocations of supervised
release.248
The result is that Luci will now have a clear understanding of
whether and how she should appeal the federal district court’s decision
to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.249 Luci will also now know that
the district court’s determination will be given a large degree of
deference, just as it was before Booker.250 She will additionally have a
lucid understanding that “plainly unreasonable” is the adopted
standard.251 But most importantly, perhaps, she will know that she is
receiving the same treatment as defendants in her shoes in every
appellate court across the nation. That is the greatest victory for the
resolution of this split among the circuits.
Anne E. Zygadlo*

See supra Part III (giving an analysis of the standards).
See supra Part IV (proposing “plainly unreasonable” as the rightful standard).
247
See supra Part III (laying out the circuits’ analyses of the standards).
248
See supra Part IV (advancing “plainly unreasonable” as the appropriate standard).
249
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (introducing this hypothetical).
250
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (presenting this hypothetical).
251
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text (providing the facts to this hypothetical).
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